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Summary 
Delivering substantially increased new and additional, adequate, predictable 
and sustainable financial resources will have to be a key outcome of the 
UNFCCC negotiation process towards an international climate change 
agreement to be achieved in Copenhagen by the end of 2009. Resources are 
required to assist developing countries in mitigating emissions (incl. REDD) 
and adapting (incl. insurance) to the adverse consequences of climate 
change. During the last year, a number of countries have made proposals for 
instruments that could deliver a certain amount of financial resources. 
This briefing paper analyses seven key approaches that have been proposed 
and judges them against a number of politically relevant criteria. As a 
conclusion, the international sale of AAUs, through auctioning a share or 
selling it at a fixed price, appears to be the most favourable option, ideally in 
combination with approaches to generate resources from the sectors 
international aviation and maritime transport. However, there are still 
unanswered legal and technical questions regarding the different proposals 
which would require further investigation. 
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Summary for Policymakers 
The international response to climate change and the negotiations in the context of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are not only 
crucially dependent on the definition of reduction targets and action obligations, but also 
on the provision of additional financial resources for mitigation (inter alia for the 
reduction of tropical deforestation), technology cooperation and adaptation to the 
consequences of climate change in developing countries.  Available studies so far agree 
in their conclusion that the carbon market will not be sufficient to cover the additional 
annual costs of hundreds of billions that are necessary for keeping global temperature rise 
as far as possible below 2°C as compared to pre-industrial levels. Moreover, emissions 
trading instruments (including the flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol) do not 
directly generate funding for measures to adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate 
change. (Nevertheless, financing options that are linked to the emissions market, such as 
the sale or auctioning of emission permits involving governments or the private sector, 
may serve as a key source of funding.) 
Another point is that the Bali Action Plan creates an explicit, political interdependency 
between the measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV) climate efforts in developing 
and newly industrialising countries and the equally measurable, reportable and verifiable 
enabling support measures by industrialised countries in the form of technology 
cooperation, financing and capacity building. The establishment of this link was the crux 
that almost led to the failure of the Bali negotiations.  
That is why in the UN negotiations as well as in the research community multiple 
approaches to generating additional resources on a sufficiently large scale are discussed at 
the moment. This briefing paper will thoroughly analyse these suggestions with regard to 
multiple criteria that determine the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of the different 
instruments with regard to the generation of resources, and that can be derived from 
existing, legally binding agreements under the UNFCCC and the Bali Action Plan. 
Despite the large variety of suggestions it may be strategically preferable to focus on one 
main instrument or at best a combination of logically connected instruments, since a 
considerable resistance to the introduction of new financing instruments must be 
expected. In doing so it is important to test whether certain options are able to generate 
resources even before a new climate treaty will enter into force in 2013 because 
developing and newly industrialising countries will need short-term support for the 
implementation of their climate-friendly development strategies and immediate 
adaptation measures. Global emissions will have to peak before 2020 – so no time must 
be wasted! 
All in all, the authors draw the following conclusions: 
1. “First-best”-option is the international sale (auctioning/fixed price) of Assigned 
Amount Units (AAUs, Option 4); it 
- can generate sufficient resources in addition to existing mechanisms (particularly 
Official Development Assistance, ODA) if designed appropriately; 
- creates an “automatic“ funding mechanism; 
- implements the polluter-pays principle and thereby creates incentives for further 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions;  
- basically represents an upscaling of the EU’s current approach (auctioning 
combined with earmarking of the revenues); 
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- guarantees that all industrialised countries contribute their fair share (i.e. all 
countries that will be assigned absolute reduction targets in Copenhagen). The 
countries that are not assigned absolute reduction targets in Copenhagen can be 
also included through e.g. sectoral agreements; 
- is consistent with the structural approach of the Kyoto Protocol but at the same 
time broadens it by enabling the inclusion of newly industrialising countries 
through sectoral agreements; 
- is technically relatively easy to implement. 
How governments generate the resources required to purchase the AAUs needed remains 
in their domain. For example, it can be used to further incentivise emission reductions on 
a sub-national level by generating the necessary revenues through domestic emission 
trading auctioning which sets a price for private companies. 
In the negotiations, this instrument is being discussed with increasing frequency by 
several countries and it aligns well with the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, which is 
basically the provision of a public good, namely the avoidance of dangerous climate 
change (Art. 2 of the Convention). The international sale of emission permits is the one 
option that enables an internationally consistent approach and generates resources that are 
additional to existing government funding.  
However, since emission allowances would not be given out for free anymore, 
governments may be incentivised to commit to less ambitious reduction targets. This 
evasive behaviour could be effectively avoided by increasing the share of costly AAUs up 
to 100 percent (in this case possibly at a lower price). The affected revenue stream could 
moreover be insulated from market price volatility by choosing to sell allowances at a 
fixed price instead of auctioning them off, or by other arrangements to limit the volatility.  
To date international aviation and maritime transport are not yet covered by the Kyoto-
Protocol but the EU strongly and rightfully supports its inclusion to ensure its 
environmental integrity. It follows from the polluter-pays principle, equity considerations 
and the sheer volume of required revenue inflows that these sectors should be obliged to 
contribute – ideally through their inclusion in an emissions trading system with 
auctioning of the allowances. Considering the negative experiences made in the past with 
the climate policies of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) it is important to ensure the 
UNFCCC’s strong role in this process.  
Several arguments therefore indicate the advantages of international sales of AAUs 
combined with the inclusion of international aviation and maritime transport. The latter 
component can thereby be understood as a logical extension of the former as international 
aviation and maritime transport are relevant sectors that up to now are excluded from 
national emissions budgets. It is, however, possible to exempt flights to certain regions, 
for example, to the Least Developed Countries or the Small Island Developing States, 
from the auctioning system and impose a certain charge per ticket instead. In this context 
it is of particular political relevance that the group of Least Developed Countries, 
containing at the moment 48 countries, support a global aviation level to generate 
resources for adaptation measures. 
2. The second best solution seems to be the auctioning of allowances within 
regional/national emissions trading systems (ETS) and the earmarking of the revenues 
for international purposes. This approach also promises significant financial flows and it 
provides additional incentives for reducing emissions. Nevertheless, the costs are solely 
incurred by the affected sectors in those countries that are included in an ETS. 
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Calculations reveal that this approach has the potential to generate even higher financial 
flows than the auctioning of AAUs if the share for sale of AAUs is assumed to be lower 
than 10 percent. According to the EU Commission’s initial proposals, in the EU alone up 
to EUR 50 billion could have been generated through 100 percent auctioning. The ETS 
only incorporates about 50 percent of the AAUs in the EU, while some of the models 
currently discussed in the USA even suggest the auctioning of all permits covering all 
sectors of the US economy. However, for the purpose of this paper, which are the 
contributions to international climate finance, the important factor is the share of revenues 
that is earmarked and then delivered for international climate protection. In the case of the 
EU, it has not been exactly determined which share or sum of the revenues will be used 
for international purposes, but there is little doubt it will be significantly less than 100%.1  
Notably, the second best option could complement the first best solution if governments 
would decide to pass on the ultimate cost burden to the private actors participating in the 
trading scheme. Moreover, it is theoretically feasible to exempt those countries from the 
auctioning of AAUs that have already implemented national or regional emissions trading 
systems for funding purposes. This approach, however, would only be favourable if these 
funds were bindingly earmarked by international law and, if necessary, the percentage 
that is used for international climate funds is adjusted. 
Another interesting approach is to use option 1 as non-compliance instrument for op-
tion 2. If countries do not deliver their fair share via auctioning of allowances at the end 
of the year, the equivalent amount of AAUs could be auctioned internationally in the 
following year.  
3. The use of general national budgets for international climate policies (Option 1) only 
complies with the polluter-pays principle in case contribution criteria are defined 
accordingly. Only through these criteria may the instrument provide additional incentives 
for further emissions reductions because the ultimate source of funding generally remains 
open (as it is the case in AAU auctioning). Additional enforcement rules – particularly a 
credible sanctioning mechanism – would be necessary to build sufficient trust in the 
realisation of the set targets. (Again option 1 could be an interesting complement as a 
compliance mechanism). The relation of trust in this approach has diminished in the past 
due to the high rate of non-compliance with the again and again promised 0.7 percent 
target for ODA for long time. Hence, this option must always be seen in combination 
with other instruments that additionally safeguard accordance with the polluter-pays 
principle and determine who ultimately bears the costs.   
4. A carbon tax (Option 6) is a very attractive option in theory. However, it is likely to 
encounter strong resistance from national governments due to sovereignty concerns. 
5. All other financing options are dependent on specific circumstances and could at the 
most be used to complement other funding mechanisms. 
6. Negotiations on the introduction of a tobin tax (Option 7) under the UNFCCC cannot 
be expected, but maybe in other fora. As it has been discussed in the past, it may be an 
option to increase non-climate ODA flows.  
The following table summarizes the evaluation of the different instruments with regards 
to the multiple criteria that will be further elaborated on in chapter 2.  
                                                     
1 Germany for example provides around 30% of the revenues that are used for climate purposes to 
international measures (and about half of overall 2008 revenues have been used for climate change related 
activities). 
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1 Introduction to the role of new and 
additional funding mechanisms 
The findings of the IPCC and the Stern review clearly demonstrate that the investments 
that are necessary to prevent highly dangerous climate change are below the cost of 
dealing with the consequences of doing nothing.8  Nevertheless, cost estimates predict a 
need for additional financial resources that amount to hundreds of billions to fund 
mitigation measures, including the “Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD)” and technology cooperation as well as measures to adapt to the 
adverse climate impact in developing countries including a multilateral climate insurance 
instrument.9 The G77 and China refer to these estimates indirectly when claiming in the 
international climate negotiations that the level of new and additional funding per year 
must at least be as high as 0.5 to 1 percent of total GDP of the Annex-I (industrialised) 
countries (approximately equal to annually USD 201 to 402 billion).10  
 
1.1 Mitigation and the limits of the carbon market 
The scientific as well as the political debates about new and additional financing options 
for mitigation are undertaken with the recognition that international public funds should 
be designed to increase an absolute amount of resources provided by the funds but also to 
specify the roles of public and private funding for effective use of the same amount of 
resources. In fact, the major share of the required investments in emissions reductions has 
to be made by private actors, for example through Foreign Direct Investments in 
developing countries.11 Nevertheless, the relative contributions of public and private 
funding differ significantly across purposes, i.e. depending on whether one looks at 
technology cooperation, REDD, adaptation or insurance and also across target countries, 
i.e. whether one looks at emerging economies, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), or 
other developing countries. 
Particularly in the area of mitigation (with the exception of LDCs) the main challenge is 
considered to be the mobilisation and diversion of large-scale private investment flows 
towards low-emitting and low risk forms of electricity generation and enhanced energy 
efficiency.12 Analyses, for example by the International Energy Agency, reveal that 
failing to meet this challenge will most likely result in a rise in global temperature of at 
least 5°C by the end of this century. This increase would significantly exceed the two-
degree limit which the EU considers crucial for avoiding dangerous climate change. Only 
if investment flows will be more effectively diverted towards the development of 
sustainable energy supply sources in the near future, a long-term lock-in effect to carbon 
intense technologies can be prevented. Furthermore, the enormous sum of private capital 
that is required will only be accessible for mitigation investments if the surrounding 
political, economic and social conditions are perceived favourable by private investors. In 
cases where public funds can be used effectively to eliminate these investment barriers on 
multiple levels and thereby significantly enhance inflows of private capital, the 
leveraging effect can be seen as an indirect financing option. On the national policy level, 
                                                     
8 IPCC, 2007a; Stern, 2006. 
9 UNFCCC, 2008a. 
10 G77 and China, 2008. 
11 Haites, 2008; Zhang and Maruyama, 2001. 
12 Cosbey et al., 2008; IEA, 2008. 
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concrete measures to be taken in this context include, for example, the elimination of 
inefficient energy subsidies or the abolition of international trade restrictions.13 
Market failures always justify further public policy interventions or the extended use of 
public monies. This phenomenon occurs typically in the context of investment in research 
and development of climate-friendly energy technologies due to its public good 
characteristics of public goods. The existence of external effects here triggers strategic 
behaviour of market actors, which then results in an inefficiently low investment level. 
Severe market failures exist in almost all phases of the innovation cycle and also hinder 
investment in energy efficiency where a lack of information and very long amortisation 
periods impede socially efficient market outcomes. In the absence of direct pay-off 
incentives for private actors market-based instruments may fail to generate sufficient 
levels of funding for climate protection and must therefore be complemented by public 
resources. Following this argumentation, Stern (2006) concluded that the carbon market 
only represents a partial solution to the funding problem.14 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as one of the financial mechanisms under 
the Kyoto Protocol triggers the cooperation between actors in industrialised and 
developing countries in combating climate change. The mechanism thereby also serves as 
a means to mobilise private investment. However, due to its many existing weaknesses a 
discussion has emerged about different ideas for reform and improvement. 
A fundamental problem of the CDM is that potential demand for certificates does not 
match potential supply. Based on the anticipated reduction targets for industrialised 
countries the UN climate secretary estimated the demand for certificates to lie in the 
range of only 0.5 to 1.7 Gt of CO2-equivalents per year. In fact, the highest estimate for 
future demand was published by Point Carbon.15  This forecast assumes that that all of the 
OECD countries and all European non-OECD countries as well as international aviation 
and maritime sectors will be assigned binding emission limits in the Copenhagen 
agreement. According to these calculations, the USA would account for 54 percent of the 
demand for certificates while another 20 percent would come from the EU.  
Another assumption made in this estimation is that the mitigation potential in developing 
countries in 2020 amounts to around 7 Gt of CO2-equivalents. This figure includes the 
reduction potentials inherent in the technologies currently recognised by the CDM, the 
potentials offered by REDD until 2020 as well as the potential offered by Carbon Capture 
and Storage technologies (CCS). Notably, the major share of the total mitigation potential 
can be achieved at a cost of less than USD 25 per ton.16  So clearly there is no match 
between supply and demand.   
All these estimates were published before the global economic crisis had fully shown its 
impact. It has become clear by now that emissions will be far below the expected level of 
emissions at least in the near term, independent of climate policy measures to be 
implemented in reality. In the EU the prices for EU emission allowances have already 
halved in March 2009 compared to autumn 2008, as well as the price for CERs.  
An additional point to consider is that the CDM in its current form is a pure offsetting-
mechanism and does therefore not lead to any additional emission reductions in 
developing countries since the realised reductions are accounted for in the GHG balances 
                                                     
13 See e.g. UNEP, 2008; Cosbey et al., 2008 ; Doornbusch and Knight, 2008. 
14 Assuming a stabilization scenario of 550 ppm Stern estimated the annual cost of climate protection in non-
OECD countries in 2015 to equal 69 billion USD, out of which only 24 billion could be generated through 
carbon markets. In 2025, however, the carbon markets would be expected to generate the largest share of 
funding.   
15 Point Carbon, 2008 
16 UNFCCC, 2008a 
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of the industrialised countries. In order to comply with the 2°C limit, more ambitious 
reduction targets in industrialised countries need to be complemented by significant cuts 
in emissions below the business-as-usual scenario particularly in the rapidly 
industrialising countries. Hence, there is no doubt that the CDM in its current form is not 
designed in a way to meet this challenge. Another related issue is that a considerable 
number of CDM projects implemented to date do not meet the additionality criteria, 
which implies that their positive recognition in the mitigation performance of 
industrialised countries actually leads to increased overall emissions.17   
Moreover, the developing countries increasingly express their discontent with the fact 
that industrialised countries harvest all the “low hanging fruits” in these countries but at 
the same time expect them to commit to more ambitious domestic reduction efforts. This 
conflict of objectives in the EU policy (i.e. creating low-cost mitigation opportunities for 
European industry in developing countries on the one hand and demanding stronger 
efforts from their side on the other hand, which leads to competition for low cost 
reductions) needs to be resolved.  
All in all, there is no doubt that mitigation efforts and REDD will require large-scale 
additional financial flows that cannot be delivered by the CDM alone. The political 
need for establishing further funding mechanisms is therefore implied by the Bali 
Action Plan, which stipulates the enhanced climate protection efforts of developing 
and newly-industrialising countries are dependent on the industrialised countries’ 
provision of measurable, reportable, and verifiable support in terms of technology 
and finance.  
 
1.2 Adaptation to climate change impacts 
In the long run the scale of financial resources required for adaptation will be determined 
by global mitigation performance. The larger the achieved decline in emissions, the lower 
will be the cost of adaptation. In turn, costs are expected to increase significantly with 
every rise in global mean temperature.18 In the medium term, however, i.e. over the next 
two decades, the impact of climate change and thus the costs of adapting to it will not be 
affected by current mitigation efforts. It is also important to recognise that even a 
temperature increase of 2°C as compared to pre-industrial levels will have significant 
consequences and may possibly lead to a long-term but irreversible sea-level rise of 
several meters.19 In fact, a rise of this scale would seriously threaten the physical 
existence of 43 small island states, which is the reason why the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS) - in Poznan for the first time - has officially called for limiting 
temperature rise to 1.5 degrees.20 The 48 states in the group of Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) seriously discuss to support this position as well. Likewise, the chair of the IPCC, 
Rajendra Pachauri in his plenary statement in Poznan, expressed concern about the 
possible insufficiency of the 2°C limit to avoid dangerous climate change. He suggested, 
it might be necessary to limit warming to 1,5 °C. Since funding needs for adaptation are 
mainly concentrated on the most affected countries that are in particular the LDCs and the 
Small Island Developing States, public resources must be seen as a key approach because 
incentives for the private investment in this area are relatively weak.21 In the medium 
term, enhanced involvement of the private sector could be promoted through a well-
                                                     
17 Schneider, 2008 
18 IPCC, 2007b 
19 Vgl. Hansen et al., 2008 
20 AOSIS, 2008 
21 UNFCCC, 2008a 
 12 Germanwatch 
designed multilateral insurance or risk sharing mechanism that triggers pro-active 
adaptation efforts as a means of risk management and generates premiums, for example, 
for reinsurance of micro or infrastructure insurances, and other instruments.22   
 
1.3 The state of the debate after Poznan 
The discussion on future funding mechanisms at the COP/CMP in Poznan (Dec. 1 – Dec. 
12, 2008) mainly took place in the context of the “Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA)” and the 2nd Review of the Kyoto Protocol under 
Article 9. Particularly the proposals submitted by Norway (auctioning of emission 
permits), Mexico (Multilateral Climate Change Fund) and Switzerland (international 
carbon tax for funding adaptation), and the G77 plus China (determination of 
contributions on the basis of GNP) were in the focus of the debate. 
A frequently mentioned point of critique was that to date the industrialised countries, 
including the "frontrunner" EU, have not made a clear statement concerning future 
funding regimes, whereas a growing number of emerging economies and developing 
countries have presented relatively ambitious strategies for climate protection, notably, 
South Africa, China, Mexico, and Brazil. The G77 and China, speaking for the 
developing countries, presented its ideas regarding a future institutional framework for 
cooperation in technology and finance. In the course of the discussions about these 
strategies and proposals it became obvious that their transformation into national policies 
requires immediate international action, which means that the provision of additional 
resources must not be delayed until after the new climate treaty regulating the post-2012 
period will enter into force in 2013. Both mitigation and adaptation activities cannot wait 
until 2013 - and financing is a necessary condition. Moreover, the relevant paragraph in 
the Bali Action Plan moreover clearly states that the complete, effective and sustainable 
implementation of the convention through long-term cooperation must be achieved “now, 
up to and beyond 2012” (BAP 1). For these reasons and for the purpose of creating an 
atmosphere of trust that may facilitate the ratification process following the negotiations 
in Copenhagen it is necessary that the Copenhagen agreement will include provisions that 
deliver additional resources already before 2013 so that further activities (technology, 
REDD, adaptation) can be supported quickly. 
In Poznan the provision of short-term additional resources was indeed one of the most 
controversially discussed issues in the negotiations on the 2nd Review of the Kyoto 
Protocol under Article 9 and it had finally to be closed without agreement. The main 
dispute concerned the extension of the CDM levy on other flexible mechanisms under the 
Kyoto Protocol (Joint Implementation and Emission Trading, see 3.2.) already before 
2013. Eventually, the industrialised countries refused to approve the extension and were 
moreover unwilling to give a clear signal in favour of the auctioning of emission permits 
(see 3.4). In fact, the lack of consent in these issues has raised major concerns in 
developing countries particularly in South Africa, one of the most constructive emerging 
economies in the negotiations.23  
                                                     
22 IIASA, Germanwatch, 2008; MCII, 2008  
23 "We are in particular concerned about the trust deficit; the widening gap in trust between developed and 
developing countries; and generally, we are disappointed by the lack of leadership by some developed 
countries. This includes (i) the inability of some developed countries to come forward with credible and 
ambitious mid-term targets; (ii) the deafening silence from developed countries in response to detailed 
G77&China proposals on technology and finance; and (iii) adaptation funding taking a back seat. (...) I am 
quite certain that binding support to developing countries could trigger matching mitigation commitments to 
act." Van Schalkwyk, 2009 
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The COP decided in Poznan that a first draft of Copenhagen’s negotiation text shall 
be available by June 2009 at the meeting of the AWG-LCA in Bonn. The draft may 
then serve as a basis for the further deliberations. It is of major importance that the 
EU and other industrialised countries define a clear position in the debate on future 
financing options as soon as possible. This is the prerequisite for using the close 
interrelation between the climate protection efforts made in developing countries 
and the level of support provided by industrialised countries to create and sustain a 
positive momentum for the upcoming negotiations. In this regard, the EU has failed 
to move forward significantly in their recent conclusions on Copenhagen adopted by 
the Heads of States summit that was held on 19/20 March in Brussels.24 It is 
progress that the EU indicates to negotiate about different options for generation of 
adequate financing. But the signal regarding the willingness to finance adequately 
("fair share") is not clear enough to send a positive signal to the negotiations. This 
has to be seen as a strategic mistake and a missed opportunity to create additional 
dynamics for the upcoming negotiating sessions. 
 
2 Overview of potential funding sources 
Since the Bali Action Plan was agreed on in 2007 the political and scientific debate on 
options for a new financial architecture serving for climate change measures has become 
more substantial and realistic. In addition to the concrete proposals submitted by the 
Parties under the UNFCCC process the debate on financing models is also enriched by 
contributions from scholars and the business world.  
2.1 The analysed instruments and evaluation criteria at a 
glance 
Based on available studies the following options will be analysed in greater detail: 
1. Resources from general national budgets25 
2. Extension of the levy on flexible instruments (“share of proceeds” from CDM, JI 
and possibly from the trade in AAUs) 
3. Auctioning of emission allowances (national or regional) 
4. Sale (auctioning/fixed price) of a portion of national emission allowances (AAUs) 
5. Introduction of an aviation or maritime levy or the inclusion of these sectors into 
the emissions trading system 
6. Introduction of a global carbon tax, i.e. a general tax on all climate relevant 
activities  
7. Introduction of a “tobin tax”, i.e. a general tax on international currency 
transactions   
These options will be discussed regarding their compliance with the following list of 
criteria that was derived from the UNFCCC, the Bali Action Plan and other politically 
relevant considerations: 
a) Expected revenues: A new or advanced financial architecture must generate the 
amount of resources necessary for stabilising the GHG concentrations below the 
level that is sufficient to prevent dangerous climate change. It should be noted that 
these estimates are indicative at best because most of the underlying assumptions 
have uncertainties and are manipulable in both directions, upwards and 
downwards, through political negotiations. Without a quick recovery the actual 
                                                     
24 See EU, 2009 
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economic crisis has the potential to limit all expectations  regarding income from 
the carbon market (auctioning). 
b) Predictability: Resource availability must be reliable. This is important for 
building trust among different countries and for safeguarding the viability of the 
whole financial architecture, also regarding its catalytic effect on private 
investments.  
c) Climate impact and compliance with the polluter-pays principle: mitigation impact 
and reflection of the polluter-pays principle: The polluter pay principle should be 
reflected in order to enhance further mitigation activities. The analysis examines to 
what extent the instrument directly provides additional incentives for reducing 
emissions by internalizing its social costs into the polluters’ calculations. A related 
aspect is the extent to which the instrument enables the differentiation between 
countries (industrialised versus developing countries and/or within these groups) 
according to their responsibilities. 
d) Effects on competition: A negative impact on competition should be avoided. Thus, 
it is investigated to what extent the instrument may affect international competition 
among states and private actors.26 
e) Interference with national sovereignty and political feasibility: Interference with 
national sovereignty decreases political feasibility. Thus, the analysis provides an 
estimate on the extent to which the instrument interferes with national sovereignty 
and the anticipated level of political resistance. It is important to recognize that 
these aspects may differ from country to country and therefore must also be 
considered from a constitutional perspective. 
f) Additionality: The Bali Action Plan as well as the UNFCCC constitute the 
additionality of funds as a key criterion, which prevents a simple “renaming” and 
diversion of existing development assistance flows. However, there is 
disagreement on its interpretation, regarding the question whether additionality is 
defined in relation to actual ODA payments or in relation to the existing 
commitment of industrialised countries to make 0.7 percent of GNI available for 
ODA purposes. The latter interpretation could imply that out of the resource pool 
that is generally available for ODA only those contributions count as additional 
which exceed the anticipated baseline of ODA payments until 2015. This date is 
the agreed  (Millennium Development Targets) deadline for industrialised 
countries as their deadline for achieving the 0.7 percent target. Furthermore, 
additional resources could also in this case come from sources that generally not 
allow counting against ODA commitments. Another related approach that might be 
discussed is to increase the 0.7% target, in accordance with the additional resources 
to be generated for climate policy objectives, which, however, should be 
accompanied by a stronger compliance mechanism. 
A further criterion that is relevant in the negotiation context is the time frame for 
implementation of the suggested models. More precisely, this relates to the question 
whether an instrument requires the ratification of a new climate treaty (or of an extended 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 This approach is also often referred to as “assessed contributions” 
26 In general, it can be concluded that the effect on competition is minimised when all countries are equally 
involved. However, the UNFCCC as the basis for negotiations explicitely differentiates between so-called 
Annex-I (industrialised) and non-Annex-I (developing countries) and thereby constitutes a certain degree of 
unequality. Interestingly, some proposals (Mexico, Schweiz) comprise ideas on how to overcome the Annex 
based structure of the Kyoto Protocol. The course of the discussions on this issue is not yet foreseeable. 
Principally, the sale/auctioning of AAUs can also be combined with sectoral agreements in emerging 
economies. 
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Kyoto Protocol) to come into effect or whether it could be implemented earlier already as 
part of a Copenhagen agreement in order to enable near-term financing. Currently, 
available legal expert judgement about this issue is insufficient, and some parties have 
contradicting viewpoints, for example, regarding option 4. That is why further legal 
analysis of this aspect is necessary, but can not be dealt with in this briefing paper. 
2.2 Definition and differentiation of liabilities to 
contribution 
In the UNFCCC discussions different methods for determining obligations for 
contribution are discussed (for example, those suggested by Norway, Mexico, 
Switzerland, the AOSIS, G77 plus China or by academics). Interestingly, some of these 
proposals overcome the Convention’s strict distinction between Annex-I (industrialised) 
and non Annex-I (developing) countries and thereby promote the inclusion of emerging 
economies and developing countries according their national capabilities and 
responsibilities. This approach also adheres to the fact that one of several basic 
foundations of the Convention – that the “largest share of current global emissions of 
greenhouse gases” originates in developed countries -  is no longer true. The fact does 
question neither the historical responsibility nor much higher per capita emissions of the 
developed countries, but shows that the world is changing.27  
From a strategic viewpoint it may be more conducive to future negotiations to speak of 
“nationally appropriate actions” and not to use the emotionally loaded and ambiguous 
term “differentiation”. Most of the approaches to defining obligations aim at 
operationalising the UNFCCC’s fundamental principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities” (Article 3.1) by referring to specific indicators 
such as GDP per capita or (current or historical) CO2 emissions per capita (current or 
cumulative, for example, 1992-2004).28  
Table 2 shows the results of one of the most elaborated models, the “Greenhouse 
Development Rights Framework”, that determines percentage-based liability obligations 
on the basis of capacity (measured through per capita income) and responsibility 
(measured through cumulative per capita emissions since 1990). The EU’s liability, 
accounting for 25.7 percent of total funding in 2010, is expected to diminish over time 
due to the overall increase in emissions from developing countries, particularly in China. 
 
                                                     
27 UNFCCC, 1992: 2 
28 See Baer et al., 2008; Mexico, 2008; AOSIS, 2008; Switzerland, 2008 
 16 Germanwatch 
Table 2: Responsibility and Capacity Index (RCI) for selected countries and 
country groups according to the “Greenhouse Development Rights Framework”. 
Source: Baer et al., 2008: 18 
 
 
2.3 National obligations in the context of international 
instruments 
Considering past experiences with (mostly non-binding) international obligation there is 
good reason to question the predictability and reliability of contributions paid out of 
national budgets. The so-called “domestic revenue” problem may impose a major barrier 
to predictability and reliability as it constitutes that it is difficult to achieve sustained 
political agreement on the use of national tax revenues for the provision of global public 
goods. According to this logic, domestically raised resources should remain subject to 
national authority.29 The willingness among citizens, government and parliament to 
provide domestic public revenues for international purposes will diminish the larger the 
scale of the required resources. A good example of this phenomenon is the voluntary 
commitment of industrialised countries to spend 0.7 percent of their GNI on ODA. Since 
this decision was made in 1970 only very few countries have achieved this target (at the 
moment five countries). On average, the share of GNI dedicated to ODA equals only 0.28 
percent and more than USD 100 billion annually would be required to close this gap.30 
The reaction by some countries to significantly cut down ODA, , for example Ireland and 
Italy, due to the current economic crisis, underlines again the lack of reliability of such 
voluntary commitments.  
In addition to actually generating the necessary resources for mitigation and adaptation, it 
is therefore important that the negotiations leading to a new climate treaty also help to 
                                                     
29 Müller, 2008a; Doornbusch and Knight, 2008 
30 Harmeling, 2008 
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restore the trust among countries that was destroyed in the ODA debate. Here, at least 
three approaches need to be considered: 
1) Obligations binding under international law should be complemented by an 
appropriate sanction mechanism to ensure compliance and/or 
2) Funding instruments should be complemented so that maximizes conformity 
with the polluter-pays principle and guarantees a sufficiently high level of 
performance of the obligations (particularly options 1, 3, and 4 could serve 
this function).  
3) Innovative financing mechanisms should be designed in a manner to generate 
resources independent of national budgets. 
 
Combining options 1 and 2 is possible and could be complemented with option 3. 
The following example illustrates the possible interplay of these three options: It is 
assumed that parties of the UNFCCC agree on anticipating the financial needs in 
developing countries to amount to say EUR 150 billion a year. Principally, these costs 
should be allocated to individual states on the basis of certain criteria for differentiation. 
Thereby, the relative obligations are determined (option 1). In case additional, innovative 
financing instruments are implemented (option 3, for example a levy on international 
aviation), that generate, for example, EUR 50 billion, only the remaining EUR 100 billion 
would need to be covered by national contributions and the same allocation key could be 
applied. Instruments such as the auctioning of AAUs or a GHG levy could then be used to 
make responsible polluters incur these remaining costs. 
This kind of hybrid financing model thus works in three steps: First, national liabilities 
are determined, then it is investigated to what extent these could be covered through 
international instruments and at last, complementary instruments on the domestic level 
are chosen to fund the remaining share.31 The advantage of such a hybrid approach is that 
it helps to alleviate the domestic revenue problem mentioned earlier without 
compromising the necessary increase in available resources. Doornbusch and Knight 
(2008) and Müller (2008b) therefore consider a hybrid financial architecture to be a 
practical solution as it combines the benefits of different alternatives. However, the 
performance of the individual instruments regarding the evaluation criteria is likely to 
change when implemented in combination. In general, it may therefore be most 
promising to focus the discussion on one instrument or a small and logically closely 
related group of instruments, instead of considering a wide range of options.  
Furthermore, two additional aspects are worthwhile noticing: 
1. So far the political debate about some of the instruments has been mainly 
focussed on their suitability to finance specific purposes. For example, option 2 – 
extending the share of proceeds (see 3.2) - is typically considered as a means to 
enhance the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, option 4 
that had been suggested by Norway to finance adaptation in the first place is now 
frequently discussed in the context of funding for avoided deforestation or 
technology cooperation. In general, it is preferable to analyse the different 
instruments independent of the intended use of the generated resources because 
the goal is to develop an overall financial architecture that enables funding for a 
variety of purposes. 
2. A criteria-based approach may also be useful to determine the contribution of 
each individual instrument to the overall pool of resources. For example, such a 
calculation could help to determine the shares of AAUs to be purchased by 
different countries (see 3.4). Instead of simply assuming the same share for all 
                                                     
31 Müller, 2008a 
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countries based on the agreed-on reduction targets, this more differentiated 
approach would actually allow for taking specific aspects such as past emission 
developments and historical responsibilities into account. Although this method 
would alter the instrument's impact on competition, these effects are politically 
justifiable in order to implement the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities.  
                                                
3 Analysis of the individual instruments 
In this section the suggested instruments will be analysed individually with reference to 
the outlined evaluation criteria. Table 1 on page 5 summarizes the key conclusions of 
chapter 3.  
 
3.1 Resources from general national budgets 
Relevance in the international discussion: With reference to the UNFCCC’s fundamental 
constitution, particularly the G77 and China demand for enhanced contributions to be 
made out of the national budgets of industrialised countries. In total, payments in the 
range of 0.5 to 1 percent of GNI (approximately USD 201 to 401 billion, 2007) are 
claimed with the largest part coming from national budgets.32 In the context of a criteria-
based determination of national liabilities for all countries (see 2.2 and 2.3) domestic 
budgets may play an important role but they could moreover be combined with other 
instruments including the sale of permits under national or regional ETSs (3), the 
international sale of parts of the AAUs (4) or the sale of AAUs on the country level.  
a) expected revenues: In theory, revenues can amount to the level of financing deemed 
necessary by the G77 and China (hundreds of billions per year). However, the level 
of contributions would ultimately depend on political decisions made by national 
governments and international negotiators. 
b) Predictability: The experiences made with ODA demonstrate that the reliability of 
voluntary funding commitments is limited, for example, by domestic revenue 
problems. A high level of predictability is only given in case 
- the obligation is appropriately fixed under international law; 
- the criteria for determining the individual liabilities are well defined; 
- there exists an adequate sanctioning mechanism to address non-compliance. 
However, the probability for an effective sanctioning mechanism to be incorporated in the 
post-2012 framework is low. Among other reasons, constitutional concerns in some 
countries (for example in Japan) might trigger resistance. All in all, the predictability of 
this financing option is limited. 
c) Climate impact and compliance with the polluter-pays principle: On a national level 
the approach simply leads to a collectivisation of environmental costs without 
directly incentivising further mitigation efforts. However, the polluter-pays principle 
could be internalised in two ways: 
- On the international level: By choosing appropriate criteria for determining national 
liabilities the countries’ payment obligations can at least partly be subjected to the 
polluter-pays principle (see, for example, the Swiss proposal and to a certain degree 
the Mexican proposal), which moreover enables an objective differentiation within 
the groups of industrialised and developing countries respectively. 
                                                     
32 G77 and China, 2008 
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- On the national level: Governments may implement domestic measures to ensure 
that polluters ultimately pay for the international contributions, for example, an ETS 
with auctioned allowances, or emission taxes, and thereby directly trigger emission 
reductions. 
d) Effects on competition:  Assuming that all of the relevant countries are participating, 
the direct impact can be considered neutral because national governments are 
principally free in their decision about how to fund their contribution domestically. 
However, a significant divergence of national approaches for resource generation 
may affect competition between specific sectors. 
e) Interference with national sovereignty and political feasibility: 
- The extent to which national sovereignty is compromised correlates with the level of 
resource contributions that governments commit to under international law. 
- This commitment already means a significant interference, particularly if it is based 
on the legally binding acceptance of the internationally agreed on criteria for 
determining national liabilities, because in this case the calculation of the payment 
obligations becomes an automatic process. The impact becomes even stronger if a 
sanctioning mechanism is to be established. 
- In any case national governments retain their authority regarding domestic funding 
sources. 
- Particularly in the current economic crisis it is reasonable to assume that the higher 
the targeted level of resource generation, the higher will be the anticipated political 
resistance of finance ministers towards this financing instrument.  
- It is questionable that agreement on the implementation a meaningful sanctioning 
regime could be reached. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of this option, at least as a partial solution, is generally 
expected to encounter less political opposition than the option of international emission 
taxes (3.6) or the levy on international currency transactions (3.7). Hence, a realistic 
approach might be to use national liabilities as the basis of a hybrid solution and 
complement it with national/regional auctions of tradable emission permits (3.3) or the 
sale of AAUs (3.4).  
f) Additionality: This option does not actually open up new resources. It appears 
realistic to expect that the national contributions will be allowable against the 
general ODA commitment if no clear rules can be established that payments to count 
as ODA must at least exceed an adequate baseline. In some cases, one may even 
observe a reallocation of existing ODA payments. 
 
3.2 Extended “share of proceeds” for CDM, JI and 
international emissions trading 
Relevance in the international discussion: The levy “share of proceeds” on CDM 
transactions is constituted in the Kyoto Protocol. Whenever emission reduction 
certificates are issued to CDM projects 2 percent are taken and given to the Protocol’s 
Adaptation Fund. Recently, the extension of this mechanism to also include Joint 
implementation projects and international trade in AAUs has been discussed. In Poznan, 
the G77 and China have pushed for an extension of the “share of proceeds”, both as a 
means for short-term financing (prior to 2012) and as integral part of the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol after 2012. However, it must be kept in mind 
that at least for the time after 2012, a major objective of any financing model should be to 
ensure involvement of the USA in funding international climate change policy. Anyway, 
reaching agreement in Copenhagen on the extension of the “share of proceeds” to JI 
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could be important for future dynamics of negotiations since it would finally put an end to 
the anticompetitive, unequal treatment of CDM and JI. 
a) Expected revenues: The level of resource generation achievable through the 
extension of the “share of proceeds” is dependent on the levy rate and future market 
developments, which in turn largely depends on future mitigation targets in 
industrialised countries and the hereby implied demand for emission reduction 
certificates: 
- The existing 2 percent levy on CDM projects is estimated to generate revenues of 
about USD 80 to 600 million over the time period between 2008 and 2012.33 The 
revenue inflow after 2012 is dependent on the further advancement of the CDM.34   
- The extension of the levy to Joint Implementation and international Emissions 
Trading between countries after 2012 could potentially lead to additional revenues in 
the range of USD 30 million to 2.2 billion per year.35 
- In principle, raising the levy rate is also an option (for example, to 3 to 5 percent as 
suggested by Pakistan).36  
b) Predictability: The levy is due “automatically” with every first transfer; however, 
the overall amount is dependent on the total volume of CDM-/JI-projects and/or the 
volume of trade in AAUs as well as on future market price developments. For 
example, the price for CERs has halved by March 2009 compared to September 
2008, as a consequence of the economic crisis. The future of CDM-/JI-markets is 
significantly affected by the mitigation targets for industrialised countries. The 
earmarking of the revenues for climate-related purposes is very likely to be sustained 
even in case the “share of proceeds” is significantly extended. 
c) Climate impact and compliance with the polluter-pays principle: Incentives for 
enhancing mitigation are provided by creating a market for CO2 in the first place, 
which means that the additional effect of the transaction levy can be expected to be 
neutral. To a certain degree, the levy on flexible instruments could restrict the 
economically rational realisation of low cost mitigation opportunities. The UNFCCC 
however, does not directly define pure cost efficiency as its overriding goal, the 
framework rather links this aspect with more fundamental equity considerations.  
The polluter-pays principle would be respected in the sense that certificates 
purchases are made to off-set emissions, but do not have an additional effect. 
d) Effects on competition:  
- The effects are neutral assuming identical levy rates worldwide. However, 
exemptions already exist: It was decided in Bali that CDM projects in LDCs should 
be freed from the 2 percent levy.  
- In theory, the levy represents an additional cost factor that may restrict the economic 
viability of realising low cost reduction potentials. However, compared to other 
existing barriers to the implementation of CDM projects such as complex 
administrative procedures or high transaction costs these effects can be considered 
minor.  
                                                     
33 UNFCCC, 2008a 
34 The implementation of, for example, sectoral agreements has the potential to generate a significantly higher 
number of certificates and thus significantly enhance expected revenues. 
35 See, for example, UNFCCC, 2008b: 41; until 2012: currently 3 Gt in the pipeline, 2 percent thereof equal 
60 Mt, multiplied with a price of EUR 10 result in revenues of EUR 600 million; the FCCC secretary 
estimates USD 80-300 million p.a. with 300-450 mio. CERs issued p.a. at a price of USD 23.60. 
36 An argument opposing the extension of the share of proceeds on project-based mechanisms, which is 
brought forward also by the EU, is that this would compromise the profitability of the projects and thereby 
make mitigation more costly. But it remains questionable whether the economic viability of projects would 
seriously be affected, accounting for the fact that many projects to date cannot be considered additional in the 
narrow sense and would have been worthwhile undertaking even without CDM revenues (see 1.1.)  
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- At present, the CDM is disadvantaged as compared to the other flexible mechanisms, 
i.e. JI and international Emissions Trading, since the latter two are not affected by 
such a levy.  
- It is not yet decided whether and in what way the USA as a non-Kyoto party will 
make use of these instruments in the future. Currently they are excluded from the 
financing mechanism. 
e) Interference with national sovereignty and political feasibility:  
- With regards to CDM and JI national sovereignty is (at most) only indirectly affected 
since the levy is imposed on private market transactions;  
- the government’s discretionary power to get involved in both mechanisms is 
generally not compromised; 
- a more significant interference is given in case the levy was imposed on international 
emissions trading, i.e. on the transfer of allowances from one Annex-I country to 
another. 
The political opposition to the implementation of an extended and/or enhanced levy on 
JI/CDM can generally be expected to be rather limited in the context of a Copenhagen 
deal compared to other approaches, because of the limited scope of this instrument. In the 
authors' view this holds true even if no agreement could be reached in Poznan on that 
issue, which had timing, strategic as well as legal reasons. However, it would probably 
require an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, which may become a serious obstacle but 
could be integrated in the post-2012 agreement. Extending the “share of proceeds” to also 
cover trade with AAUs is legally feasible but little realistic from a political perspective. 
f) Additionality: This financing option is in fact able to generate truly additional 
resources because instead of relying on direct government payments it is based on 
contributions in the form of emissions reductions units that would then still require 
liquidation. This circumstance can be expected to prevent the declaration of these 
contributions as part of ODA.  
 
3.3 Sale of emission certificates in national or regional 
emission trading schemes (ETS) 
Relevance in the international discussion: The EU and Germany have already presented 
this option as an innovative financing mechanism. It is moreover considered by the 
authors to be a potential measure for funding compliance with national liabilities (see 
chapter 2.2). Notably, this option is only relevant to countries that have already 
implemented emissions trading schemes or plan their implementation in the future (i.e. 
primarily industrialised countries). In fact, not even all of the Annex-I countries can be 
expected to meet this condition prior to the start of negotiations in Copenhagen. In 
addition it is possible that a Copenhagen agreement will include the implementation of 
emission trading schemes for internationally relevant sectors that also involve these 
sectors in non-Annex I countries (see also 3.5). 
 
a) Expected revenues: The level of generated resources is mainly dependent on the 
market price for certificates and the share of allowances that is dedicated for sale by 
auction: 
- According to first estimates of the European Commission for the EU trading scheme 
revenues of about EUR 50 billion could be generated until 2020 assuming an 
auctioning rate of 100 percent at a price of EUR 30 per ton. However, following the 
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recent decisions about the EU climate and energy package these figures require 
significant downward adjustment.37  
- In case all industrialised countries, particularly the USA implemented emissions 
trading schemes, total revenues would potentially multiply. 
- Relevant to the international negotiations is only the share of revenues that is 
actually dedicated to international climate policy measures and is not earmarked for 
domestic investment purposes. The EU yet has not agreed on a fix percentage of the 
revenues to earmark for international purposes. 
 
b) Predictability:  
- The absolute level of resource generation is dependent on the market price of 
certificates and the share of allowances that is not allocated for free.  
Regarding the transfer of resources on the international level it is crucial 
- whether this instrument is combined with the determination of national contribution 
obligations; 
- to what extent these obligations are binding; 
- and to what extent the earmarking of the auctioning revenues for international 
purposes is actually enforceable. 
The combination of this option with funds coming from national budgets (3.1) or the sale/ 
auctioning of AAUs appears to be a realistic solution. The sale/auctioning could also be 
used as a non-compliance mechanism for countries which don't fulfil their financing 
obligation based on auctioning in the national emission trading system. At this point in 
time it is not yet foreseeable which industrialised countries (and possibly which specific 
sectors in emerging economies) would enter into cap-and-trade schemes. The new US 
administration is seriously discussing a nation-wide Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) 
with a significant share of auctioning and has announced to try to move this forward as 
much as possible until Copenhagen. In face of the severe economic crisis, more recent 
statements by President Obama suggest that most of the resources might be used 
domestically for various purposes, but there are other voices as well.. 
 
c) Climate impact and compliance with the polluter-pays principle: In contrast to 
grandfathering systems the early price signal provided by this instrument 
incentivises additional mitigation efforts and enhances the trading scheme’s 
efficiency and its steering effects.   It should be noted, however, that the hereby 
defined price for CO2 only reflects abatement costs and not necessarily means the 
full internalisation of all external effects. Conformity with the polluter-pays principle 
is only given if all relevant polluters are actually included in the trading scheme or 
another scheme like a levy or tax. 
 
d) Effects on competition:  
- The sale of allowances has generally less adverse effects on competition than their 
free allocation since windfall profits are prevented through the internalisation of 
opportunity costs. The impact is generally dependent on the design of 
regional/national ETS.  
- The impact is neutral within the sectors that are included in the trading scheme, 
except if approaches are applied that differentiate for example to lower the burden 
for heavy-polluting companies, which is often politically desired. 
                                                     
37 This is due to the initial exclusion of most of the industrial sector from the auctions, the exemptions agreed 
on for the energy sector and the permission of high shares of price deflating CERs. However, assuming a 
successful outcome in Copenhagen it will be necessary to modify the present regulations. 
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- For sectors that compete internationally, the relocation of emission intense industries 
to countries that do not participate in the trading scheme and lack comparable 
regulation may lead to “carbon leakage”. That is why additional sectoral systems are 
discussed in the  UNFCCC and in contributing processes like the Major Economies 
Meetings,  that could possibly even enable the inclusion of emerging economies into 
the trading scheme. 
- In order to minimize impacts on competition within the transportation sector as well 
as between the transportation sector and other sectors such as telecommunications, it 
would be preferable to include international aviation and maritime transport into the 
trading system. 
 
e) Interference with national sovereignty and political feasibility: The implementation 
of an emissions trading scheme which comprises the sale of certificates and the 
earmarking of revenues significantly interferes with national sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, political agreement in favour of this instrument may still be easier to 
achieve than for those instruments suggesting to sell off a share of AAUs (options 
3.4), to introduce an international emission tax (option 3.6) or to impose a levy on 
international currency transactions (option 3.7) because the discretionary power 
retained in the hands of government is still greater. By including aviation into the 
trading scheme and auctioning off a share of the certificates with earmarked 
revenues the EU has already taken a first step towards integration of options 3.3 and 
3.5.   
 
f) Additionality: In the absence of clear and enforceable rules that at least define an 
adequate baseline (see 2.1.) it is likely that the contributions made under this 
approach will be deducted from ODA obligations. However, the earmarking of the 
generated resources for climate-related purposes is rationally justifiable and its 
implementation can therefore be realistically assumed. 
 
3.4 Sale / Auctioning of AAUs  
In the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) the Annex-I countries 
receive their share of “Assigned Amount Units” for free. Selling (via auctioning or via a 
fixed price model) a share or all of the AAUs is now one of the key options being 
discussed to generate additional financial resources. It is often referred to as the 
Norwegian proposal.  
According to this proposal, a certain portion of allowances is deducted from a country’s 
quota prior to their allocation and then either auctioned off through some kind of 
international institution or sold for a fixed price. In principle, this approach is similar to 
option 3.2, but happens on a different level. 
It would also be possible to design AAU auctioning in a way that Annex-I countries 
receive 100 percent of their allocated emission allowances first, but are obliged under 
international law to sell off a certain share of their quota (domestic sale). In this case, 
decisions on method and timing of the liquidation remain in the discretion of national 
governments. Potential buyers include either the respective government or actors in those 
sectors that have to realise a share of the overall national obligation. 
All in all, both options are quite similar, which is why there are presented together. The 
main difference is that the second option warrants the national governments a higher 
degree of discretionary power because they can choose between an auction and an 
outright sale and which institution should be in charge of administering the transaction. 
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This degree of freedom, however, may overall compromise the consistency of the system 
across industrialised countries. And in fact only the international approach is now 
seriously being discussed in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
Relevance in the international discussion: Norway has proposed the international sale 
(more specific: the auctioning) of AAUs in Bali for the first time and has been 
continuously promoting the model since then. In Poznan, the EU has shown more 
openness towards a consideration of AAU auctioning. Only recently, Heads of States of 
the EU had concluded that “market-based approaches based on auctioning arrangements” 
are one of two options specifically mentioned (the other one is the contributory approach 
based on an agreed scale).38 In Poznan, Switzerland mentioned the possibility to combine 
the Norwegian proposal with their own concept and in fact, Norway and Mexico 
deliberate on the feasibility of combining both approaches. Among NGOs (CAN 
International) and some scholars the international auctioning of allowances is seen as one 
of the most promising options because it has the potential to generate resources of the 
required scale and moreover it is well compatible with the logic of the existing climate 
policy architecture.39   
In this context it is crucial whether such a solution would be integrated into the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol or whether it would be implemented under the 
convention (or through some kind of linking provisions). In the first case the adequate 
participation of the USA in the international financing effort must be ensured in order to 
avoid compromising the instrument’s effectiveness (i.e. the high level of generated 
resources), its neutrality in terms of effects on competition and its fairness. Up to now the 
G77 and China have focused the international discussions about this option in the Kyoto 
negotiations track and a position in the AWG-LCA negotiations has not been defined yet. 
One way to signal general openness towards debating the two options without risking a 
premature commitment to one or the other may be to ask the UNFCCC to produce a 
Technical Paper about their design and implementation.. In doing so, the feasibility of 
combining AAU sales with criteria based approaches (as for example suggested in the 
proposals by Mexico and Switzerland) should be assessed. 
 
a)  Expected revenues: Depending on what share of AAUs is dedicated for sale, the 
expected revenues could amount to tens or hundreds of billions: USD 15 to 25 
billion assuming a portion of 2 percent40 , and up to 52 billion assuming a portion of 
7.5 percent41, 42.  
 
b) Predictability: With an appropriate climate treaty entering into force, the occurrence 
and level of funding can be considered secure: 
- the participation of countries in the initial allocation process is very likely;  
- An outright sale at a fixed price as compared to an auction may possibly reduce 
future revenue streams but makes them more predictable at the same time.  
- However, the level of resource generation is dependent on future market 
developments. 
- In the most extreme case revenues could fall short of expectations due to a 
sufficiently large drop in emissions that can be either politically induced or caused 
                                                     
38 EU, 2009a: 11  
39 See Müller, 2008a; CAN International, 2008 
40 UNFCCC, 2008 
41 Oxfam, 2008 
42 The calculation is generally easy, given baseyear emission levels, the assumed reduction target, the 
assumed portion of AAUs for sale and an assumed market price: baseyear emissions = approx. 21.6 Gt (incl. 
USA), reduction of 25 percent until 2020 => approx. 16 billion AAUs, thereof 7.5 percent for sale => approx. 
1.2 billion AAUs. 
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by other effects and that effectively compensates the partial sale of AAUs. The 
current economic crisis is exactly the latter case. Moreover, parties could 
deliberately choose lower reduction targets in order to avoid the purchase of 
allowances. The risk of strategic behaviour can be minimised if countries had to 
purchase all of their AAUs.  
- The option of international sales is favourable over the domestic sale in terms of 
predictability as it overcomes the domestic revenue problem. 
- Withholding an additional share of AAUs from national budgets is an option to raise 
additional revenues in case Parties do not comply with their funding obligations. 
- For a post-2012 commitment period a key question is the banking of AAUs not used 
in the first commitment period. If banking would be possible, than it might be the 
case that Annex I Parties would buy for example “Hot air” AAUs instead of  
purchasing AAUs from an international auctioning procedure. The resources would 
than go  to the countries selling the “hot air” rather than contributing to international 
climate finance. 
 
c) Climate impact and compliance with the polluter-pays principle:  
- By setting an early price signal this instrument incentivizes additional mitigation 
efforts;  
- Countries with higher emission levels typically have to spend more money on 
allowance purchases; 
- The instrument’s steering effect may be lost however, when countries push for less 
ambitious mitigation targets in order to partly or fully circumvent their purchase 
obligations. Selling off all of the AAUs effectively prevents this type of strategic 
behaviour. 
- At present, the instrument is only applicable to countries with assigned reduction 
targets (Annex-I countries). However, there is a general possibility for broadening its 
scope to include sectoral emissions trading schemes even in emerging economies 
that do not face national obligations at the moment. 
- The impact is the same for all countries in need of AAUs and it reflects a strict 
implementation of the current polluter-pays principle. 
- The historic responsibility which is not addressed explicitly may be addressed 
through differentiating the quota that Parties have to purchase, in the sense of what 
has been described in chapter 2.2.   
 
d) Effects on competition:  
- The effects in terms of competition are neutral for countries with reduction targets 
and presuming that the portion of AAUs to be sold is identical across countries;43 
- at present, the instrument is therefore only applicable to Annex-I countries, while 
leaving developing countries that are currently exempted from binding targets 
uninvolved; 
- If internationally competing sectors in Annex-I countries face higher cost due to 
their inclusion in the emissions trading scheme while the same sectors in non-
Annex-I countries are free from this constrain, competition may be distorted. This 
issue can be resolved by establishing appropriate sectoral agreements with 
developing countries.  
 
e) Interference with national sovereignty and political feasibility:  
- At first glance, the interference with national sovereignty appears to be larger than 
for other options. 
                                                     
43 The impact of the instrument on individual countries with or without implemented emissions trading 
systems requires further investigation. The authors are not aware of any studies elaborating on this question. 
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- Since emission allowances were allocated for free in the first commitment period, 
the introduction of a future sale-off of allowances would principally just reflect the 
“scaling-up” of the existing EU ETS system. 
- Countries can effectively circumvent their purchase obligations by achieving larger 
emission reductions. 
- The political feasibility of this instrument on a national level is likely to be 
dependent on the ultimate source of funding. The money spent on the purchase of 
AAUs could either come from the general budget (3.1), the auctioning of permits in 
national/regional ETSs (3.3) or from other revenue generating measures. Also, an 
exception could be established for those countries that have implemented 
national/regional ETSs and have bindingly earmarked a sufficiently large portion of 
the revenues for international climate purposes.44 
 
f) Additionality: To avoid the ‘domestic revenue problem’, the AAUs could be pooled 
in a holding account at the International Transaction Log (ITL), before they are 
issued to the country registries, and then be auctioned.  In that case, it is at least not 
plausible that resources spent on the international purchase of AAUs could be 
deducted from national ODA obligations or that this treatment would find the 
necessary support in the negotiations, since the primary objective is to purchase an 
international good, and not a solidarity action.45 Hence, there is good reason to 
assume that the funds raised through international sales of AAUs are truly additional. 
Regarding sales on the country level, additionality is primarily dependent on the 
extent to which the financial contributions are allowable towards the ODA quota. In 
fact, assuming the percentage share of allowances for sale to come close to 10 
percent, the instrument is able to generate sufficient revenues to close the gap with 
the 0.7 percent target in some countries. This point is likely to raise severe concerns 
among developing countries.    
 
3.5 The imposition of aviation and maritime levies or the 
inclusion of these sectors into the emissions trading 
system  
Relevance in the international discussion: The individual options are mentioned in 
different contexts: 
- the 48 LDCs explicitly demand the introduction of a ticket charge to finance 
adaptation measures (International Air Passenger Adaptation Levy, IAPAL); 46  
- India recognises a levy charged on international aviation and maritime transport 
under the convention as a possible option.47 
These statements by developing countries should be seen and appreciated as an important 
and positive signal because they demonstrate a general willingness to contribute to the 
international funding efforts through this type of mechanisms. In fact, some important 
members of the G77 and China still strictly oppose the inclusion of both air and maritime 
transport into the emissions trading system. On the other side, Tuvalu (not a member of 
the G77 and China) recently expressed explicit support for including these sectors as a 
means to generate additional funding. It should be kept in mind, however, that the 
inclusion of international aviation into the ETS in the EU (already approved) and the 
USA would already be sufficient to capture around 80 percent of the climate impacts of 
                                                     
44AAUs are not allowable in the EU-ETS. 
45 Müller, 2008a 
46 LDCs, 2008 
47 India, 2008 
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international aviation. For maritime transport, inclusion in Annex-I targets would be 
much more difficult and does not seem to be a desired option.48 
Possibly, in case of a rapid introduction, levies may be used to raise funds for adaptation 
and other purposes already prior to 2013; or, if introduced by developing countries, as a 
measure that complements the revenue generation through auctioning in Annex I Parties 
(when aviation is included into their targets).  
 
a. Expected revenues: Kerosene tax: assuming a rate of Euro 0.05 per litre, approx. 
EUR 13-21 billion worldwide p.a.49 
b. Aviation levy. 
i. assuming a rate of about 5 percent of the flight ticket price, approx. EUR 10-
16 billion worldwide p.a.50  
ii. assuming a rate of USD 2 to 100, ranging from USD 0.2 to 24 billion p.a.51 
c. Maritime levy (International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme, IMERS): 
USD 4–15 billion p.a.52 
d. Inclusion of maritime transport into the ETS: USD 10-16.6 billion p.a.53 
e. Inclusion of aviation into the ETS: USD 12.4 billion p.a.54 
f. Tuvalu Burden Sharing Mechanism55: aviation and maritime levy differentiated 
according to country groups (Annex-I, non Annex-I): USD 1.6 billion p.a.56  
 
b) Predictability:  
- Although the levy is due “automatically” every time a certain service is purchased, 
the total volume of generated resources is dependent on the demand for the 
respective services. The levy rate or the market price for certificates (mainly 
specified by the stringency of the cap) determine the instrument’s ecological steering 
effect; 
- Regarding the inclusion into ETS the predictability is somewhat lower due to the 
relatively high volatility of the market price for CO2, compared to for example the 
demand for flights; 
- Most of the currently available calculations assume that the impact of the discussed 
levies on the quantity of demand for the affected services is rather small.57 Therefore 
a generally high level of predictability is given even though significant variations are 
always possible (for example, regarding the drop in demand for flights due to the 
economic crisis or the 09/11 terrorist attacks, or volatile auction prices for 
certificates).   
 
c) Climate impact and compliance with the polluter-pays principle: 
a. Kerosene tax/GHG levy: The internalisation of external costs and additional 
ecological steering effects are generally feasible if the levy rate is set sufficiently 
high (realisation of technological potentials and improved air traffic management). 
b. Charge on flight tickets: The additional steering effect is likely to be small due to 
low price-elasticity and the missing link to caused emissions. If the charge varies 
regarding distance, the indirect effects would be similar to those described under a. 
                                                     
48 See also WWF, 2008 
49 WBGU, 2002 
50 WBGU, 2002, Oxfam, 2008 
51 Chambwera und Müller, 2008 
52 UNFCCC, 2008a 
53 WBGU, 2002 
54 Oxfam, 2008 
55 Tuvalu, 2008 
56 Müller, 2008a 
57 See e.g. LDCs, 2008 
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c. Maritime levy: Analogue to b. Analogue to a. in case of a GHG-related levy. 
d. and e. The inclusion of aviation and maritime transport into the ETS: The sale of 
certificates creates a price signal that reflects abatement costs but fails to guarantee a 
full internalisation of external costs. 
f.  see b. and c.  
- All of these options relate to climate relevant behaviours and therefore conform with the 
polluter-pays principle in general, but vary with regard to how strict the principle is 
applied: GHG-based levies perform better in this criterion than just a ticket tax, for 
example. 
 
d) Effects on competition:  
- The effects in terms of competition are neutral assuming that identical rates are 
charged in all relevant countries and all of the relevant sectors are included. 
- In fact, the inclusion of air and maritime transport would abandon the Kyoto 
Protocol’s inherent distortion of competition regarding reduction targets and funding 
contributions, which must be viewed positively.    
- The politically motivated differentiation between countries (as suggested by the 
Tuvalu proposal) may have higher impacts on international competition, which, 
however, can be justified politically by the common but differentiated 
responsibilities principle. 
 
e) Interference with national sovereignty and political feasibility:  
a. Kerosene tax/GHG levy: The introduction of a global tax on kerosene cannot be 
considered a realistic option. In fact, many of the two to three thousand bilateral 
“Aviation Service Agreements (ASAs)” that are currently in force explicitly prohibit 
a kerosene tax. Although a universal solution through the ICAO (see Article 2, 
paragraph 2 of the Kyoto Protocol) is generally feasible, its implementation would 
encounter severe opposition as shown by past experience (even though generally 
permitted according to Articles 15 and 24 of the Chicago agreement). 
b. Charge on flight tickets: Generally feasible, i.e. not prohibited by international 
aviation law, but probably more difficult to communicate as a climate protection 
measure than, for example, a direct charge on emissions. However, as a means of 
resource generation specifically for adaptation purposes communication may in fact 
be facilitated due to the clear link between the charge and its use to pay for the 
damages caused by flying. The acceptance of this option differs widely among 
different countries.58 Notably, the LDCs as a group have recently expressed their 
unified support for a global ticket charge.59  
c. Maritime levy: Addressing this issue globally makes sense, particularly considering 
the ease of simply changing flags. Another advantage is that private companies 
instead of governments face the costs, which could facilitate international agreement, 
since developing countries are mostly unwilling to commit to contributions from 
their side.60 
d. Inclusion of maritime transport into the ETS: The inclusion is already discussed 
under the IMO.61 However, under the UNFCCC the inclusion turns out to be more 
difficult. 
e. Inclusion of aviation into the ETS: From 2011 on, aviation will be part of the 
European ETS. While a global inclusion as a part of the post-2012 regime appears 
                                                     
58 Following a French initiative around 13 countries have implemented a charge on flight tickets since 2006. 
Among those are also several African LDCs that aim at raising funds for the combat against HIV/AIDS as an 
aspect of the Millenium goals. 
59 LDCs, 2008 
60 Whether this is conform with IMO rules remains to be tested. 
61 However, here the revenues are intended to go to a maritime emission mitigation fund, to support 
mitigation activities in the maritime sector.   
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less likely, this possibility cannot be completely excluded. The USA is currently 
discussing a possible inclusion and since the major share of international aviation is 
within the USA and between the USA and Europe bilateral consultations are crucial 
in this context. see b) and c). 
All in all, interference with national sovereignty can be considered minor since only very 
specific activities are affected. 
 
f) Additionality: The additionality as compared to the target ODA quota may depend 
on whether the levies are charged through national or international institutions (for 
example the International Maritime Organisation, IMO) and how governments  
consider them in their accounts. One possible procedure would be that airlines 
transfer the charges directly and independently of national institutions to the 
international funds (for example the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol), 
which would clearly make them additional. In case the sectors are included in the 
ETS the money would go through national budgets and count as national 
contributions (see 3.3), which means that additionality would again need to be 
defined with reference to an adequate baseline. 
 
3.6 The introduction of a global carbon tax 
Relevance in the international discussion: The very detailed Swiss proposal on the 
introduction of a global carbon tax as a means to finance adaptation measures has brought 
the issue back on the negotiation agenda.. However, Switzerland has emphasised that a 
key aspect of the concept is to establish a link between a criteria based approach and the 
polluter-pays principle, which basically means that the determined obligations to 
contribute may also be effected differently.  
 
a) Expected revenues: depending on the exact design; Swiss proposal: USD 48.5 billion 
(USD 2 per ton of CO2, with a tax free amount of 1.5 t per capita).62 
 
b) Predictability:  
- Assuming that all climate relevant activities are covered a high degree of 
predictability is ensured. 
- The tax rate is fixed, which minimizes the fluctuations that are observable for 
instruments based on trade due to their dependence on market prices. the same time, 
this approach might open doors for political manipulation if the tax rate is not 
specified by international law. 
- As in the case of contributions made from national budgets predictability may be 
enhanced through internationally binding regulations (including sanctioning 
mechanisms). 
 
c) Climate impact and compliance with polluter-pays principle:  
- Putting a price on carbon incentivises all emitters to enhance mitigation efforts. 
- Whether internalisation of external costs is actually achieved depends on the tax rate. 
- However, the currently most intensely discussed Swiss model does not account for 
historical responsibilities - however these might be defined - but only considers 
present emissions levels.  
                                                     
62 Switzerland, 2008. According to the Swiss proposal, out of the 48.5 billion, 18.4 billion would go to a 
multilateral adaptation fund, 12.2 billion to national climate funds in high income countries and 17.8 billion 
to national climate funds in medium or low income countries. 
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d) Effects on competition: According to the Swiss proposal the effects on competition 
can be considered neutral as each ton of CO2 is taxed at the same rate except for a 
free exemption of 1.5 ton per capita (this benchmark is derived from scientific 
findings). As a consequence, LDCs would rightfully be freed from the tax burden 
due to their very low per capita emissions. Distortions can only be prevented if only 
“comparable” tax rates could be applied worldwide. 
 
e) Interference with national sovereignty and political feasibility: Although the degree 
of interference is generally dependent on the tax rate, one can expect it to be 
significant since all climate relevant activities within the national borders would be 
affected. Political feasibility is therefore considered low. This situation would 
probably change if the USA decided to implement a tax on CO2. Moreover, 
interference with emissions trading could compromise the instrument’s efficiency. 
 
f) Additionality: Considering the sheer volume of monetary means that is currently 
under discussion it can be assumed that these resources are additional to ODA 
obligations. Nevertheless, many industrialised countries push for their deductibility 
and in the absence of an adequately defined baseline additionality could not be 
guaranteed.  
3.7 The introduction of a “Tobin Tax” 
Relevance in the international discussion: Although it is occasionally referred to no 
country seriously considers this an option in the negotiation process. If at all, the 
introduction of such a tax is more likely to be agreed on in the context of a reform of 
financial markets (Bretton Woods II) than in the context of the UNFCCC process. 
a) USD 15-20 billion p.a.63, depending on the tax rate revenues could amount to 
hundreds of billions.64  
b) Predictability: Although the tax is due “automatically” the total sum is dependent on 
the volume of currency transfers. The imposition of such a tax could trigger 
circumventing behaviour by switching to financial transactions that are not affected. 
c) Climate impact and compliance with the polluter-pays principle:. Both aspects find 
little consideration. There is no direct link with the external costs caused by GHG 
emissions. 
d) Effects on competition: If only international currency transactions were affected, 
distortions in favour of national currency transactions would probably occur. 
However, such a tax might also help to reduce the volume of distorting speculations. 
e) Interference with national sovereignty and political feasibility: The intervention 
occurs indirectly since primarily private actors are affected. The political feasibility 
is low considering the current situation of financial markets. Moreover, the 
introduction of a tobin tax for climate policy reasons is difficult to justify due to a 
lack of logical interrelation between the two issues.65 
f) Additionality: Since the money is raised through international markets this option 
would enable access to a new source of funding that is independent of national 
budgets and therefore truly additional. 
                                                     
63 According to estimations by the UNFCCC secretary (assuming a tax rate of 0.01 percent on all financial 
transactions). 
64 See Felix and Sau, 1996 
65 Tobin’s intention was to use the tax to increase transaction costs in ordert to reduce foreign currency 
speculations. However, empirical evidence shows that an increase in transaction costs indeed lowers 
transaction volume but at the same time causes volatility to rise. See Aliber et al., 2003. 
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4 Conclusion 
The international response to climate change and the negotiations under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) do not only comprise the 
determination of emission reduction targets and obligations to take certain nationally 
appropriate actions but another crucial element is the provision of additional financial 
resources for mitigation (inter alia to promote conservation of tropical forests), 
technology cooperation and adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change in 
developing countries. Available studies agree in their conclusion that carbon markets 
alone (without auctioning) will not generate sufficient resources for covering the 
anticipated additional costs amounting to hundreds of billions of limiting the rise in 
global temperature to less than 2°C as compared to pre-industrial levels. Moreover, 
emissions trading systems on their own are generally not well suited for financing the 
required measures for adaptation to already unavoidable climate impacts. (Interestingly, 
market-linked mechanisms such as the sale or auctioning of allowances to governments 
or private actors may be an important or even the most important source of funding.) 
Another point is that the Bali Action Plan creates an explicit, political interdependency 
between the measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV) climate efforts in developing 
and newly industrialising countries and the equally measurable, reportable and verifiable 
enabling support measures by industrialised countries in the form of technology 
cooperation, financing and capacity building. The establishment of this link reflected a 
key issue in the Bali negotiations that, in fact, almost caused them to fail. 
This overall situation explains why in the UN negotiations as well as in the research 
community multiple approaches to generating additional resources on a sufficiently large 
scale are discussed at the moment. This discussion paper thoroughly analyses the 
different models with regards to multiple criteria that are relevant to effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity of the instruments to generate financial resources, and that were 
derived from existing international agreements, the UNFCCC or the Bali Action Plan. 
Although a large variety of ideas exists, it is strategically preferable to focus mainly on 
one key instrument in a combination of few logically interrelated instruments, since a 
considerable resistance to the introduction of new financing instruments must be 
expected. In doing so it is important to test whether certain options are able to generate 
resources even before a new climate treaty will enter into force in 2013 because 
developing and newly industrialising countries will need short-term support for the 
implementation of their climate-friendly development strategies and immediate 
adaptation measures. Global emissions will have to peak before 2020, and adaptation is 
already a compulsion for many countries – so no time must be wasted! 
 
All in all, the authors come to the following conclusion: 
 
1. The international sale of national emission allowances, Assigned Amount Units 
(AAUs), is considered the “first-best” solution (Option 4). This instrument 
 is generally able to generate sufficient resources in addition to already existing 
commitments (particularly to the 0.7% Official Development Assistance target, 
ODA); 
 thereby creates an “automatic” funding mechanism; 
 complies with the polluter-pays principle und thus provides incentives for further 
emission reductions; 
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 principally acts as an “upscaling” of the approach already implemented by the 
EU (auctioning combined with earmarking of revenues);  
 guarantees the equitable inclusion of all industrialised countries (i.e. all countries 
that will be assigned absolute emission targets in Copenhagen) but can at the 
same time be extended to also include sectoral agreements with emerging 
economies; 
 is consistent with the structural approach of the Kyoto Protocol but at the same 
time broadens it by enabling the inclusion of newly industrialising countries e.g. 
through sectoral agreements. 
 is technically relatively easy to implement. 
How governments generate the resources required to purchase the AAUs needed remains 
in their domain. For example, it can be used to further incentivise emission reductions on 
a sub-national level by generating the necessary revenues through domestic emission 
trading auctioning which sets a price for private companies. 
This instrument is analysed and discussed with increasing frequency and intensity by 
multiple countries and it effectively supports the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC 
which is basically the provision of a  public good, namely the avoidance of dangerous 
climate change (Article 2 of the Convention).   The international sale of a portion of the 
emission allowances that is deducted before these are allocated to the different countries 
is a model that enables an internationally consistent approach and at the same time 
generates resources beyond existing government funding.  
However, since emission allowances would not be given out for free anymore, 
governments may be incentivised to commit to less ambitious reduction targets. This 
evasive behaviour could be effectively avoided by increasing the share of costly AAUs up 
to 100 percent (in this case possibly at a lower price). The effected revenue stream could 
moreover be insulated from market price volatility by choosing to sell allowances at a 
fixed price instead of auctioning them off. However, overall revenues tend to be lower in 
this case.   
To date international aviation and maritime transport is not yet covered by the Kyoto-
Protocol but in particular the EU strongly and rightfully supports its inclusion to ensure 
its environmental integrity. It follows from the polluter-pays principle, equity 
considerations and the sheer volume of required revenue inflows that these sectors should 
be obliged to contribute – ideally through their inclusion in an emissions trading system 
with auctioning of the allowances. Considering the negative experiences made in the past 
with the climate policies of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) it is important to ensure the 
UNFCCC’s strong role in this process.66  
There are many arguments in favour of combining the international sale of AAUs with 
the inclusion of international aviation and maritime transport into the trading system. The 
latter component can thereby be understood as a logical extension to the former one as 
international aviation and maritime transport are relevant sectors that up to now are 
excluded from national emissions budgets. It is, however, possible to exempt flights to 
certain regions, for example, to the Least Developed Countries or the Small Island 
Developing States, from the auctioning system and impose a certain charge per ticket 
instead. In this context it is of particular political relevance that the group of Least 
Developed Countries, containing at the moment 48 countries, support a global aviation 
level to generate resources for adaptation measures. 
 
                                                     
66 See Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Kyoto Protocol 
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2. The second best solution seems to be the sale of certificates within regional/national 
emissions trading systems (ETS) (Option 3) and the earmarking of the generated 
revenues for international purposes. This approach also promises significant financial 
flows and it provides additional incentives for reducing emissions. Nevertheless, the costs 
are solely incurred by affected sectors in those countries that are included in an ETS. 
Notably, the second best option could complement the first best solution if governments 
decided to pass on the ultimate cost burden to the private actors participating in the 
trading scheme. Moreover, it is theoretically feasible to exempt those countries from the 
auctioning of AAUs that have already implemented national or regional emissions trading 
systems for funding. This approach, however, would only be favourable, if these funds 
were bindingly earmarked by international law. In case that the country does not deliver 
the promised money, the auctioning of AAUs could be used as a compliance mechanism.  
Calculations reveal that this approach has the potential to generate even higher financial 
flows than the auctioning of AAUs if the share for sale of AAUs is assumed to be lower 
than 10 percent. According to the EU Commission’s initial proposals, in the EU alone up 
to EUR 50 billion could have been generated through 100 percent auctioning. The ETS 
only incorporates about 50 percent of the AAUs in the EU, while some of the models 
currently discussed in the USA even suggest the auctioning of all permits covering all 
sectors of the USA economy. However, for the purpose of this paper, the contributions to 
international climate finance, the important factor is the share of revenues that is 
earmarked and then delivered for international climate protection. In the case of the EU, it 
has not been exactly determined which share or sum of the revenues will be used for 
international purposes, but there is little doubt it will be significantly less than 100%.67  
3. The use of general national budgets for international climate policies (Option 1) 
only complies with the polluter-pays principle in case contribution criteria are defined 
accordingly. Only through these criteria may the instrument provide additional incentives 
for further emissions reductions because the ultimate source of funding generally remains 
open (as it is the case in AAU auctioning). Additional enforcement rules – particularly a 
credible sanctioning mechanism – would be necessary to build sufficient trust in the 
realisation of the set targets. This relation of trust has diminished in the past due to the 
high rate of non-compliance with the 0.7 percent target for ODA. However, the political 
implementation of such an adequate sanctioning mechanism is considered unlikely. 
Hence, this option must always be seen in combination with other instruments that 
additionally safeguard accordance with the polluter-pays principle and determine who 
ultimately bears the costs. 
4. A carbon tax (Option 6) is a very attractive option in theory. However, it is likely to 
encounter strong resistance from national governments due to sovereignty concerns. 
5. All other financing options are dependent on specific circumstances and could at the 
most be used to complement other funding mechanisms. 
6. Negotiations on the introduction of a tobin tax (Option 7) under the UNFCCC cannot 
be expected, but may continue to play a role in generating additional resources for non-
climate ODA. 
                                                     
67 Germany for example provides around 30% of the revenues that are used for climate purposes to 
international measures (and about half of overall 2008 revenues have been used for climate change related 
activities). 
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